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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80M01048A001500030001-4

Executive Registry

72-3896

12 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Countersubversion -- A Continuing
CIA Responsibility

Over the past several months I have worked the attached paper through several drafts and discussions with the Deputies. It is now accepted by DDP, DDI, and DDS. If you approve, it will be implemented gradually and selectively, without fanfare or interagency marches and countermarches.



W. E. Colby
Executive Director-Comptroller

Attachment

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-01-01 BY 60322
AND 60322

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Copies of the attached sent to the four DD's,
D/ONE, and D/PPB on 19 July 72, with note from
ExDir: "For gradual implementation."

Cy sent to IG on 27 July 72.
Cy to [redacted] (IC Staff) via
[redacted] working on
report on human collection &
thought this germane)
Cy to Bruce Clark under memo of
17 Aug 72

Cy to [redacted] on
19 Oct 72
Cy to WEC (as DD/O) on 7 Mar 73

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	<i>Exec. Dir.</i>		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

Remarks:

The content of this paper is approved for gradual implementation.

MX

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

DCI

17 July

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Next 16 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby

Enclosed are all the responses to your
13 April memorandum on countersubversion.
You might want to note the reference to the
JFK Center in the DDP's response (para 2b).



15 May 1972
(DATE)

FORM NO.
1 AUG 54

101

REPLACES FORM 10-101
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)


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DDS



DD/S 72-1751

5 MAY 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Countersubversion - A Continuing CIA Responsibility

REFERENCE : Memo for DD/I, DD/P, DD/S from ExDir-Compt
dtd 13 Apr 72 same subject

1. I appreciate the opportunity to review your thoughtful papers about Countersubversion and Foreign Police Forces. In the Support Directorate the only immediate impact of a concentrated countersubversion program would be in the Office of Training; and, we would not anticipate any major difficulty adapting to a new or revised doctrine about the subject. Later requirements in logistics, communications and other Support services should not cause other than the usual fiscal problems. Hence, I would have no logical reason to interpose professional objection to your proposals.

2. Personally, I believe you have identified an important omission in U. S. Government (USG) program responsibilities, including a lack of focused intelligence production about foreign subversive activities and an apparent absence of constructive action proposals supporting our national interests. While I liked the thrust of your initial draft, wherein you proposed going to the National Security Council, I must agree that the present approach is more realistic, at least for the beginning.

3. I particularly subscribe to your emphasis on the rule of law and note that the USG has frequently overlooked or discounted this in earlier countersubversive activities. I understand that Sir Robert Thompson has long maintained that this is an essential consideration in mounting operations against insurgent groups. There just seems to be something logical and appealing about the rule of law that bodes well for an orderly legal attack on insurgency and subversive problems. This approach is long overdue in my judgment.

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5. Finally, Hugh Cunningham's 28 January 1972 memorandum to you contains some keen observations about past experiences and potential hazards that I hope will be studied carefully by those Agency officers ultimately assigned the responsibility for developing a coordinated approach to counter-subversion. Also, the attached memorandum from Hugh dated 27 April 1972, comments on your revised papers.

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John W. Coffey
Deputy Director
for Support

cc: Director of Training

Att

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DD/S

72 1708

27 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Countersubversion - A Continuing CIA Responsibility

REFERENCE : Memo to DD/S from ExDir-Compt (DD/S 72-1512),
dtd 13 Apr 72, same subject

1. Mr. Colby's revised paper on this subject, I believe, presents the problem and the Agency's relationship to it, in a much more precise perspective than the initial version.

2. In my opinion, the significant modifications introduced in this version, i. e., the Agency's becoming involved in countersubversion programs on a selected basis following comprehensive analysis of a given situation and appropriate policy decisions within the U. S. Government, and then only under the overall authority of the U. S. Ambassador in the particular country, establish exactly the proper framework for the Agency's role. Without an articulation and observance of these fundamental conditions, the Agency would be vulnerable to charges of professional irresponsibility and of being a power unto itself.

3. Paragraph 4 of the revision, in particular, represents the soundest possible judgment about the factors which must be considered in this entire question. However, when speaking of an intelligence analysis of a given country or situation, as this paragraph does, I would be inclined to give greater emphasis to the need to evaluate the significance of the subversive threat in terms of the strategic importance of the country or area to U. S. interests. The point is made, but deserves more stress, I think.


4. A most important factor is the challenge of bringing outside influence to bear on backward, volatile societies lacking our own traditions of political

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philosophy and institutions, economic endeavor and benefits, and individual citizen's rights. It is in this connection also that the "rule of law" factor continues to give me pause. In Asia, and to a lesser extent in Latin America, law is rooted in the interests of the ruling oligarchy. Given this contrast with our own very different legal tradition, the essentially repressive genesis of law in many underdeveloped societies poses real risks for this Agency, or any other arm of the U. S. Government which seeks to justify countersubversion programs by the enactment of appropriate legislation. It is a moot point how much restraint can effectively be exercised over the degree of law enacted.

5. Moreover, unless the rule of law also extends to the judicial and penal aspects of the system, the net result of the effort could be to increase the legal authority for controlling subversives without an accompanying due process of law to protect individual rights thereafter. While I do not think the British experience with rule of law in its former colonial societies is greatly pertinent to this subject, I do think that the solution to the Mau Mau problem in Kenya, for example, was facilitated by due process accorded the accused and the convicted.

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[Redacted Signature]


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HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM /
Director of Training

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DDI

D/PPB



Executive Registry
22-19/8

10 May 1972


MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Countersubversion - A Continuing
CIA Responsibility

1. We have reviewed your revised draft on CIA's responsibilities in the countersubversion field. The revised program is certainly much more modest and consequently much more manageable.

2. As you know, we have some in-house capability which has produced useful intelligence on insurgency movements in Southeast Asia. This type of experience is, of course, applicable to similar production efforts in other areas of the world. Assuming that a countersubversion program is confined to those subversion movements that are inimical to U. S. interests, DDI participation in the program could probably be managed with minimal reallocation of resources.

3. As you are aware, however, detailed and intensive studies of subversion activities can consume inordinately large amounts of time and resources. Thus, I strongly urge that we move slowly in embarking on a countersubversion program and resist any tendencies to study subversive movements on a worldwide basis.


EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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